But it has been a long and difficult road to get to this stage. The Russian market is closely linked to the oil price (see chart), so the collapse of oil from $140+ to below $40 in 2008 marked the start of almost a decade of disappointment. In that period, Russia’s influence in the emerging market (EM) world waned. At the end of 2007, its index weighting was 10.1%, fourth highest after China, South Korea and Brazil, with a market capitalization of $1.2 trillion. Today its weighting is just 3.3%. And its capitalization is less than half of what it was 10 years ago! Since mid-2017, oil has enjoyed a renaissance, currently flirting with $70 levels, with increasing confidence that $60+ is sustainable. The ruble - which is intricately linked to crude oil prices - has stabilized, having fallen 40% since oil stumbled violently in October 2014.
Past performance does not guarantee future results.
Internally, years of a stagnating economy have taken their toll. Growth in Russia is structurally challenged. Demographics play a role (the labor force is contracting at 1.5% per annum), but the main culprits are weak institutions, corruption and the lack of respect for the rule of law. These forces conspire to restrain private sector capital formation, which would ignite productivity and growth. However, these challenges also mean that those companies which do survive may often grow to be exceptional (and exceptionally managed) companies. Further, like other oligopolistic countries (most notably Mexico), limited competition underpins higher returns to capital employed.
The lean years triggered by the 2008 oil price collapse were exacerbated by sanctions imposed by the West in 2014. The past few years have been characterized by deep and persistent recession and a collapse in real incomes, which were eroded by high, currency-led inflation. Challenging fiscal conditions - which are dominated by oil taxes - coupled with sanctions were met with innovative policy. We have seen prudent monetary and fiscal policy; pension and insurance reform; and inflation brought under control. The private sector also navigated this climate successfully - deleveraging swiftly. With oil prices having stabilized at higher levels, capital formation recovering after a drought of three to four years and inflation at unparalleled low levels (real incomes slowly recovering), growth is beginning to percolate cyclically. The economy is only just emerging from recession with GDP growth of 1.8% in Q317. At 2.3% in January, inflationary pressures are benign, allowing the central bank to remain on an easing path.
Novatek has always been a very profitable company with ROEs consistently above 22% for the last seven years. That said, Novatek is much more than just another energy company. It has always stood at the forefront of technological and business innovation, finding creative ways to add value to its constantly expanding natural gas and condensate resource base. Novatek is going through another transformation: from a large, local independent gas player to a global LNG major. In time it could surpass even Qatar in terms of production, unlocking its massive resource portfolio from the Yamal and Gydan Peninsulas. Through its natural gas business Novatek could evolve into a very rare, cash generative pure play on the exploding appetite from Asian nations for cleaner energy and a better life style. Our fund has been a part of this amazing transformative journey with Novatek for over a decade and yet we believe that this story is still in its infancy.
Sberbank is perhaps the most privileged bank in all of the emerging markets, given its 45% share in retail deposits, and its ROA and ROE in excess of 2% and 20%, respectively. In the past three years, with an exceptional management team and huge competitive advantages, the bank has weathered the multiple economic and political setbacks in Russia extremely well, gathering measurable share from weak competitors. It has further strengthened its balance sheet during the crisis with excess capital, and widened its competitive moat with investments in fintech. Going forward, we anticipate Sberbank’s ability to capitalize on higher loan growth; improve efficiencies; and its propensity toward higher dividends will allow it to drive continued outperformance.
Magnit has been among the Fund’s longest-held investments, over a decade thus far. The company was negatively affected by the Russian economic malaise starting in 2014, with ongoing pressure continuing to weigh on results. During that period, Magnit suffered through a deteriorating domestic consumer environment with no wage growth and high food inflation along with an intensifying competitive landscape. This has resulted in recent challenging operating results and declining investor confidence. While Magnit continues to be Russia's most profitable food retailer with a leading market share, the operating environment has become more challenging, and management has had to adjust to extraordinary adversity. Frankly, this has taken longer than anticipated, but we believe Magnit is capable of recovering over the next year or two with initiatives to improve its competitiveness fortuitously coincident with a recovery in the consumer landscape. The stock trades at attractive valuations, while offering several growth options, including: rapid food retail consolidation; new formats under development (cosmetics and pharmacies); and the largest logistics network in the country.
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